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Introduction
This paper analyses political elites (cadres), economic elites (entrepreneurs), hybrid elite households and non-elite households in rural China. We seek to understand the determinants of belonging to each of the three elites categories. Are they similar or different? We also investigate disparities in household per capita income as well as in household per capita wealth between various elite households and non-elite households. Are the elites in an economically privileged position? If yes, what are the implications for household income in rural China as a whole and is there a payoff for joining the elite? Has the payoff from being a cadre household decreased? To what extent can we find support for the following three predictions that derive from Market Transition Theory: (1) Returns to political capital in terms of income and wealth decrease during the transition; (2) Returns to human capital in terms of income and wealth increase during the transition process; (3) Entrepreneurship increases income and wealth during the transition. For the study we use samples for 1995 and 2002 covering large parts of rural China.
The issue of how elites are faring in countries in the transition from a planned economy to a market economy has attracted much interest among social scientists. Of central importance to the literature is a paper by Victor Nee published in 1989 combining the formulation of the Market Transition Theory (MTT) with an empirical illustration from rural China. According to this theory, '…in reforming socialist economies the transition from redistributive to market coordination shifts resources of power and privilege to favour direct producers relative to redistributors (that is cadres). The shift improves incentives for direct producers, stimulates the growth of private markets, and provides to entrepreneurs an alternative path for socioeconomic mobility', Nee (1989) . The theory can be summarized by Verhoeven et al. (2005: 202) :
This (MTT) theory is considered to be a general theory for societies in transition, and its predictions should be applicable to all countries undergoing transition processes. The introduction and expansion of market institutions give rise to multiple bases of power and privilege and changes in the structure of opportunity and incentive. The former political elites no longer have absolute control over resources of power and privilege. Labour markets are arranged and there are changes in the structure of property rights, resulting in a decline in political power in the competition over resources, with power becoming market-based. Human capital provides more income benefits, while the influence of political capital wanes… In terms of winners and losers, the theory claims that members of the former political elite are among the losers in the transition process. They have to give ground to the direct producers of economic goods, as well as to the new elite, which consists of highly educated professionals, managers, and entrepreneurs, who can be seen as winners.
While MTT emphasizes the emergence of a new elite, some authors have stressed the conversion of the old elite into the new (the Power Conversion Thesis, PCT). 1 The number of empirical studies analysing income among elites in societies in transition from a planned economy to a market economy is now large. In a meta-study, Verhoeven et al. (2005) draw conclusions from not less than 90 publications. As China and central east europe have experienced different transition processes, and it is not surprising that the results reported in the literature differ between urban China (studied in the metaanalysis) and central and east european countries. We conclude that the MTT needs to be revised and elaborated if it is to be used as a general theory of transformation, as already suggested in the literature. 2 Nee's paper (1989) has also inspired several later studies of the economic situation of elites and non-elites in rural China. The empirical analysis in Nee (1989) was based on data from about 600 households in 1984 collected in two counties near Xiamen, in eastern China. Upon considering previous income level and some household characteristics in an income function analysis, no statistical effect of the variable 'cadre' was found (see Table 3 in Nee 1989) . However, the coefficient of being a peasant entrepreneur was positive and significant and that of being a cadre as well as entrepreneur -'hybrid elite' -was still larger (and also statistically significant). Further analysis on income change from the same data (Nee 1991) resulted in similar conclusions. Entrepreneurs and former team cadres had positive income development, but this was not the case for current cadres.
While Nee's two empirical studies were restricted to households in one province, later analyses of rural China have used larger datasets obtained from many provinces. This makes it possible to investigate if, and, how an elite position pays off due to characteristics of the location. As such breakdowns can be made in various ways, this issue has attracted attention in the literature. 3 Overall, the results supporting MTT -as it was originally formulated -are mixed. One study just barely supporting MTT is Nee (1996) , which analyses income changes from 1983 to 1989 for a sample of around 8,000 rural households collected from most provinces in China. In contrast to the results from the 1984 data, cadres were found to have had a significant positive income development. Furthermore, the study could not establish that education positively affected household income. Parish and Michelson (1996) report contradicting results from another sample for 1988 covering many provinces, the China Household Income Project (CHIP). 4 Walder (2002a) is an addition to the literature on economic position of elites in rural China. Focus for the analysis is household income observed in 1995 obtained from around 3,000 households living in 100 villages all over China. In a multivariate analysis, household income was related to household characteristics, variables indicating elite status as well as village level variables. It was found that cadre status had a significant positive payoff which did not vary by village characteristics. This was in contrast to income effects of entrepreneur status which were found to decline with the importance of wage employment in the local economy. More recently, Walder and Zhao (2006) , based on the same data, add to the income function analysis by, for example, redefining and increasing the number of categories studied by considering the fact that some non-elite households have kin that are cadres. 5
Our study continues in this tradition by defining three categories of rural elites. We estimate cross section income functions as others have before us. The cross section relations between elite status and income uncovered in such analyses should not necessarily be interpreted to be causal. A positive coefficient could be due to cadre status raising people's incomes; however, it could also be true that people with characteristics not observed in the data, such as ambition, ability and larger networks earn more and are more likely to become elite households. We aim to add to the existing literature on elites in rural China in several ways. First, a more recent period is covered than in earlier studies as we analyse data collected from the China Household Income Project (CHIP) of around 8,000 households spread throughout China for 2002. As we will show, studying a more recent period has important consequences for the results. A relatively new phenomenon that has not been well covered in the sociological literature on elites in rural China is the recent growth of the local government in better-off counties.
Second, we contribute to the literature by using similar data from the same project collected for 1995. While previous studies have relied on single cross sections, our use of repeated cross sections puts us in a better position for studying changes over time. Previous studies have analysed the payoff from being an elite household in a regression framework. We go further by also computing income inequality indices making it possible to report on how large a fraction of total income inequality in rural China is due to differences in mean income across elites and the non-elite -the third contribution. Like previous studies of the elite economic situation in rural China, we analyse household per capita income as target variable. However, we broaden the view by also studying household wealth per capita, i.e., a fourth addition to the literature.
The main results are as follows. Although experience of previously working in enterprises increases the probability of being a cadre as well as an entrepreneur household, the routes to the three elite categories in rural China vary. Education and military experience are strong predictors for being a cadre household. The probability of 5 The same survey also includes life history information making it possible to study recruitment into entrepreneurship, see for example Walder (2002b) and Wu (2006) . As the rural survey was accompanied by a similar urban survey there are a number of studies that have addressed similar issues for urban China, see for example Walder et al. (2000) and Zhou (2004) . Early studies of urban elites in China include Walder (1995) and Bian and Logan (1996) both studying Tianjin in 1988 (the later paper also 1993). When using data for rural Vietnam in 2002 and estimating models as in Walder (2002a) , Walder and Nguyen (2008) do not find significant coefficients for cadre. According to the authors the difference can be interpreted to be caused by cross-country differences in the industrialization process. Rural enterprises in Vietnam 2002 were much smaller than their counterparts in China in 1996.
being an entrepreneur household is very much related to the household's location as well as to the age of the household head, indicating that opportunities for entering entrepreneurship have increased over time, but in a spatially uneven way. Young adults in more affluent counties have a high likelihood of being entrepreneurs.
During the period studied here, political elites (village cadres or leaders), economic elites (entrepreneurs) and particularly hybrid elite households had higher average incomes and higher per capita wealth than other households and such gaps did not change greatly between 1995 and 2002. However, we also find that income inequality in rural China would only decrease marginally if elites were to have the same average income as non-elite households, while income inequality within the categories cadre households, entrepreneur households, hybrid households and non-elite households would remain unchanged. Thus the spatial dimension is much more important for income inequality and for wealth inequality in rural China.
Several findings support hypotheses derived from the Market Transition Theory. The relation between education and household income/household wealth became stronger between 1995 and 2002. Furthermore, keeping a number of characteristics constant, elite status and economic status are positively related. However, while MTT predicts that a payoff for being a cadre household decreases during transition, we find the highest payoffs to be in the best-off counties of rural China in 2002. One mechanism contributing to this is that the cadres in the well-off counties received wages much higher than their counterparts in low-income counties. These findings are more in line with the Power Conversion Thesis that old elites transform into new than with the Market Transition Theory.
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows. In the next section we discuss the context based on the literature. The data used for the study is described in Section 3 where we also define categories of elites and report descriptive statistics. The analysis of elite recruitment is presented in Section 4. We report on levels and inequality in income and wealth for the whole of rural China, of elite households and other households in Section 5. Factors determining income, wealth and subjective well-being are analysed in Section 6. The paper ends with a concluding section.
Context 6
Almost all Chinese farmers live in villages which are, the predominant form of rural organization. After coming into power in 1949, the government of the People's Republic of China gradually superimposed a new organizational structure onto the village -the commune. The basic characteristics of this unit were that the land was pooled and worked in common, the commune served as the basic accounting unit, and net income was distributed to households on the basis of work points (Naughton 2007: 234f) . At the end of the 1970s the communes were broken up and replaced by the household responsibility system as a form of economic organization however, the administrative and political functions of the village still remain today. The administrative village (Xing Zheng Cun), a unit typically consisting of several natural villages and ranging in size from a few hundred to more than a thousand members, is the lowest level of the hierarchical administrative and political structure of rural China. The number of cadres in a village is influenced by the population size of the village as well as its capacity for funding cadres. For our research questions it is important to understand that obligations as well as possibilities for funding cadres vary across space and time. Rich villages typically can afford a larger number of village administrators and also have more tasks for them to perform as the local government is deeply involved in the local economy. Furthermore, local governments that are better off can pay their cadres higher wages. We know from many other countries that during episodes of economic growth, the local government sector grows even faster. Thus it comes as no surprise that something similar seems to have happened in the better-off counties of rural China during the period under study 1995-2002. Village cadres perform numerous functions which require various skills, some of which can be obtained through formal education. The cadres serve but also discipline the villagers. The former function includes spreading information and mediating among villagers, taking development initiatives and providing the village public goods (for example schools and rural roads). Development initiatives can include administration of labour migration, industrial development projects, and start-up projects facilitated by funds from higher administrative and political levels that are allocated if the village is located in an officially designated poor area. Fulfilling tasks, deemed important by the villagers, suggests support for cadres being elected officials. China has experimented with local elections for some decades, with villagers providing input in the nomination process and also voting for village cadres among approved candidates.
However, cadres also have to implement policies that are formulated and shaped at various higher levels of the Chinese political and administrative system. For example, they have to implement the far-from-popular family planning policy. Furthermore, they have to collect fees and, before it was fully abolished in 2006, the agriculture tax. From this background it is not surprising that the township, the closest upper level, influences the appointment of village cadres to a varying degree. Such influence can occur at different stages of the process. For example, from the candidates suggested by villagers, the township can weed out those who are not preferred for certain reasons. As they have the power to appoint cadres, they do not necessarily always approve the candidate who has received the highest number of votes. 8
During the commune system, the cadres (as other villagers) were remunerated by a point system. When the present system had been in place for some time, cadres became entitled to salaries to supplement their private income-earning activities. 9 The cadre wage system is composed of a fixed component and a performance-based component.
Various criteria affect the performance-based component, among which collecting taxes/fees from the villagers as well as fulfilment of family policy goals have been rather important (see for example Chen 2007) . While a rural cadre can be described as a farmer performing administrative and political tasks as a sideline, one should understand that such a sideline can be lucrative (Tsai 2007: 55) . Since the exercise influence over the redistribution of land and activities of village-owned enterprises and politics, cadres and party members are clearly in a better economic position than is true for the average farming household. In addition, for many years -though not currentlybecoming a village cadre was often the first step in a career as government cadre. 10 While the possibility for earning a higher income is one motive for accepting an appointment as cadre, causality might also run the other way. Some persons who have earned high incomes actively seek a cadre appointment to gain more influence that in turn can pay off in economic or other terms in the future.
Since the introduction of reforms, many opportunities have appeared for villagers to improve their economic situations. One alternative open to an ever larger proportion of the adult population is working for wages, or off-farm work. 11 Labour markets have developed slowly in rural China (Knight and Song 2005; Cai et al. 2008) . Demand for labour first came from increased exports of goods, while later labour demand was to a larger extent, driven by the substantial income increase experienced by the Chinese population. Income increases, together with the establishment of markets for agricultural products, have enabled larger proportions of Chinese farmers to shift their agricultural activities from subsistence to meeting the demands from the market for agricultural products, thereby earning money. The commercialization of agricultural production has been followed by a more recent process of creating markets for land (see for example Kung 2002) .
From the planned economy, reformed China inherited the household registration system (the hukou system) which severely restricted geographic migration, particularly rural to urban migration. In pre-reform China, it was almost impossible for a rural inhabitant without a hukou to survive in an urban area. However, the situation has changed, and migration from rural to urban areas increased tremendously from the 1990s onwards. 12 Although exact numbers are not available on this flow of labour to the cities, figures considerably higher than 100 million persons are often cited. The migration streams typically consist of young adults, are often temporary, and can benefit households by adding money income to the households.
Still another possibility for villagers to earn a living apart from subsistence farming is to become private entrepreneurs. This could mean producing goods, working in the building industry or selling products or services. China's rural entrepreneurs, as defined here, include men who work in construction, men who drive lorries they own, and women who produce handicrafts or sell consumer products. In the early 1980s individual household businesses were granted legal status. At that time a cap of eight was set on the number of employees an entrepreneur could hire, a cap which has since been lifted. Now more and more people (typically men) have become self-employed (Mohapatra et al. 2007) . Wu (2006) shows that the pattern of recruitment into selfemployment has differed between urban and rural China. While a long education and cadre status deterred people from turning to self-employment in urban China, the opposite was the case in rural China. Some rural cadres who went into business kept their cadre status and in other cadre households one of the household members became an entrepreneur; these two cases constitute hybrid elite households.
A rather important aspect of China's transition towards a market economy is that the process has moved at different speeds in different parts of the country (see . The eastern part of the country was opened up according to the sixth 5-year plan for [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . The east also experienced the most rapid economic growth and institutional change. At that time the policy deliberately increased spatial differences and institutional change, while the launching of the development of the twelve western province units in 1999 marked a change in central government policy. However, while the broad division of China into the eastern, the central and the western regions shows large variation in economic development, there are also substantial spatial differences within each region, motivating analysts to work with spatial units at a lower level. 13 In this paper we will move down to the county level in the statistical analysis and show examples that the payoffs for elites vary across rural China.
Data and defining elites
The data for this study comes from the two rural household surveys by the China Income Distribution Project (CHIP) for the reference years 1995 and 2002. The surveys involved a group of researchers at the Institute of Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing and scholars from other countries. The project was assisted by the General Team of Rural Surveys at the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) that conducted the fieldwork. 14 Our sample was drawn from the large sample used by NBS in its annual household survey covering around 67,000 households. The sample is selected in a multi-stage procedure to be representative at the province level and each province statistical bureau is responsible for samples at the village level. At the village level a probability sample of typically ten households is selected. Rural households are asked to keep detailed records of their expenditures as well as to provide information on their income. A very large number of assistant enumerators are involved in helping the households keep good accounts and in checking the information.
For the research project, samples from the larger sample used by NBS were drawn. The income analysis reported in Sections 5 and 6 comes from the province level units that were sampled both years: Beijing, Hebei, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jilin, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi and Gansu. 15 This leaves us with a sample size of 7,998 households residing in 102 counties for 1995 and 8,200 households residing in 120 counties for 2002. For the analysis of elite households in Section 4 which we base on the richer 2002 data, we add data from the two autonomous regions of Guangxi and Xinjiang that were not included in the 1995 survey. The questionnaires were designed to derive total (disposable) income according to international standards, and the sampled households were questioned regarding income in kind, for example. Our variable disposable income is obtained by adding income sources including imputed rent from owner-occupied housing. Similarly, household wealth is defined as the sum of a number of wealth components. 16 While the income information is similar in the two surveys, the 2002 survey asked more questions about the background of the household and its members. Hence we concentrate the analysis of households' elite/non-elite positions to data from 2002. An interesting aspect of the data is that the sample procedure used by NBS involves the sampled household being followed in the survey for several years before being rotated out. This is why we are able to use income for a previous year in the income function analysis. In Section 6 we use 6,330 households with income information for 1993 and 1995 and 7,481 households in the same 18 provinces with income information for 2000 and 2002. 17 Inspired by previous writings, we work with three categories of elite households and the remaining category of non-elite households in the analysis. A household is classified as a cadre household if it has at least one member reported to be a (village and above) cadre, and if no member is classified as an entrepreneur. Seven per cent of the households in the 1995 sample as well as in the 2002 sample were classified as cadre households, see Table 1 . 18 Entrepreneur households are households with at least one member who is an entrepreneur, and no members who are cadres. Of all households, 7 per cent were entrepreneur households in the 1995 survey, and the proportion had increased to 10 per cent in 2002. 19 Only 1 per cent of the households in both surveys had cadre as well as entrepreneur members, therefore the hybrid elite households number 56 in the 1995 survey and 87 in the 2002 survey. The small number of hybrid households is a fact to be considered when interpreting the statistical results. Table 1 shows further that elite categories are somewhat more frequent in the eastern region than in other regions of China. Table 1 In Table A1 in the Appendix we present descriptive statistics for the various categories and the two years under study, and note only slight variation in average household size or age of adult members across categories or years. The average education level of household members has increased across the surveys and we note that elite categories are slightly more educated than non-elite households. There is a dramatic change in out of farm work across years. While non-elite households were much less involved in offfarm work than elite households in 1995, by 2002 they had caught up with the elites. Elite households, particularly the hybrid category, are somewhat more concentrated to high-income counties. Ethnic minorities make up 9 per cent of households in the 19 province-level sample in 1995 and 10 per cent in 2002 and are not frequent among entrepreneur households. 20 The 2002 data also shows that elites more often have experience in being a manager or worker in an economic unit than non-elites. Adults in 17 In our opinion this will result in more accurate measures than asking respondents retrospective questions on income, which was the strategy in the data used, for example, in Nee (1989 Nee ( , 1991 Nee ( and 1996 . The 1995 survey does not contain information on 1993 income from Beijing and Jilin. In order to make comparisons across surveys, we also restrict the sample for 2002 to cover provinces from which information was derived for both years. A sensitivity analysis showed that including Beijing and Jilin in the sample for 2002 affected the estimates only marginally. cadre households, more often than in non-elite households, have experience in the People's Liberation Army and at least one parent who was a CPC member.
Being an elite household
In this section we study factors affecting households possessing elite status. We specify and estimate a multinominal logit model with non-elite households as the omitted category. Explanatory variables include the household head's education, age and ethnic status. Other explanatory variables include whether the household head has been a soldier or has worked in an economic unit, as we expect both to positively affect the household's probability of having elite status. In order to capture possible intergenerational influences we include measures of parental education, parental party member status and parental entrepreneurial activity as separate variables. To consider possible kinship effects there is a dummy indicating whether the household having the most frequent surname of the village. Furthermore, to capture variations across rural China, we include in the specification the per capita income of the county in which the household lives as well as three dummies indicating the period in which the particular household's village received electricity (with electrification 1990 or later as well as no electricity being the omitted category). The year of electrification is an indicator of when the village was opened up to outside influences.
The estimates are presented in Table 2 in the form of marginal effects. Education of household head is found to positively affect the probability of being a cadre and a hybrid elite household and to negatively affect the probability of being a non-elite household. This could indicate that skills learned through formal education are of value for entrepreneur households, and even more so for cadre and hybrid households. An alternative to this interpretation (while not ruling it out entirely), is that people with longer formal educations have better access to networks useful for becoming an elite household. Age of household head negatively affects the probability of being an entrepreneur and also of belonging to the hybrid category. This most likely is because possibilities for becoming involved in entrepreneurial activities have increased during China's transition towards a market economy. Ethnic minority status has negative coefficients for cadre as well as entrepreneur status. This could signal barriers to entry into an elite category, or alternatively a lesser preference for entering one. In the specification we have distinguished between northwestern and southwestern ethnic minorities, and the coefficients for the former are much larger than for the latter. Table 2 The experience of having been a soldier increases the probability of being an elite household and strongly increases the probability of being a cadre household. If the household head has worked in an enterprise it increases the probability of being an elite household of all types. In contrast, coefficients for our measure of kinship are estimated with low z-statistics. Many coefficients for parental variables are estimated with high zstatistics. There is support for the existence of direct intergenerational influences in entrepreneurial activity. The probability of cadre status is positively affected by not only parental education but also by parental party membership; while the latter variable positively affects the probability of hybrid elite status, it negatively affects the probability of entrepreneurial status. Finally, we find that per capita income of the county positively affects probabilities for each of the three elite states, particularly the probability of entrepreneur status. There are also indications of an early or relatively early 'opening-up' of the village positively affecting the probability of a household achieving entrepreneur status. In contrast there is one example of a relatively early opening-up negatively affecting the probability of cadre status.
Based on the coefficient estimates we predict probabilities of belonging to each of the four categories for a selection of households and report them in Table 3 . We see that a household with a head of at least age 50 without education, situated in a low-income county (household A), has an extremely high probability (98 per cent) of being a nonelite household. However, increasing education of the head to 9 years makes the probability of being a cadre jump from 1 to 6 per cent while making the household at least 15 years younger (household C) has no visible effect on the probability of being a cadre. However, the latter change increases the probability of being an entrepreneur by more than ten times (to 11 per cent). Moving the household to a high-income county makes the probability of being an entrepreneur still higher (17 per cent). Adding the experience of being a soldier and having worked in enterprise (household E) the probability of being an entrepreneur is now up to 25 per cent, and the probability of being a cadre 17 per cent while the probability of being a non-elite household is down to 54 per cent. These jumps in the probabilities for attaining elite household status are large when compared to having parents with business experience (household F) and the village being opened up early (household G). The predictions indicate that the estimated model is successful in capturing factors leading to a low probability of being an elite, while it is less successful in predicting a high probability of elite status. One possible reason for the latter is lack of relevant variables (measuring for example willingness to take risks) in the survey. However, the process leading to elite status might also have a strong random element not possible to cover in variables obtained in a survey. Table 3 5 Income and wealth -levels and distribution
In this section we turn to look at income and wealth among both elite and non-elite households in 1995 and 2002. Figure 1 shows how the four categories of households are distributed among deciles arranged by all household income per capita. There is one panel for 1995 and another for 2002. Figure 2 provides the same information for household wealth per capita. A household's wealth situation reflects its propensity for saving from present and past incomes as well as changed asset prices. Clearly in both figures the elites are better off than the non-elite as all three elite categories are underrepresented in the first deciles and overrepresented at the top of the distribution. Particularly hybrid elite households are highly represented in the top decile. Table 4 provides mean values for per capita household income for the four categories, and we also break the sample into three regions: West (Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi and Gansu), Central (Shanxi, Jilin, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan), and East (Beijing, Hebei, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Shandong, Zhejiang, Guangdong).
Figures 1 and 2 Table 4 Average per capita income for all households in China was as much as 60 per cent higher in 2002 than in 1995, which indicates rapid growth. We find that cadre households in all of rural China have mean incomes that are around 25 per cent higher than for all households, which is the case for both years under study. Actually such a gap is slightly lower in each of the three regions. We can thus conclude that in rural China, cadre households generally have a living standard relatively similar to non-elite households. The mean income for entrepreneur households is somewhat higher than for cadre households. The hybrid elite household is not surprisingly the category with the highest average per capita income.
An income component analysis is reported in the Appendix, Table A2 . We work with the three components: agriculture income, non-agriculture income and cadre wage, the latter by definition received only by cadre and hybrid households. Observed over all regions and households, agriculture income increased modestly by 7 per cent, while non-agriculture income increased by as much as 71 per cent and the cadre wage by a slightly more rapid 77 per cent. For entrepreneur households the proportion of total income made up of non-agriculture income increased from 51 per cent to 64 per cent. Inspecting the three regions yields additional insights. In the wealthiest eastern region, agriculture income remained the same from 1995 to 2002 and the increase in total income originated solely from rapid increases in non-agriculture income and cadre wages. More remarkably, while in 2002 the gap in agriculture income between those living in the western region and those living in the eastern region was small, the proportion of the cadre wage between the two was as high as 1 to 4. We will return to the privileged position of cadre in better-off counties in 2002 in Section 6 where we report the magnitude of the economic advantage when controlling for household characteristics and in Section 7 for discussing possible causes.
The information on per capita wealth in Table 5 provides a similar, but not identical picture. The increase in the average (19 per cent from 1995 to 2002) is considerably slower than the increase in per capita income. In 1995 the gaps in average per capita wealth across the four categories of households were actually smaller than the gaps in income. However, the across-category wealth gaps widened to become more similar to the income gap in 2002. When household categories are ranked by wealth per capita, it is the same ranking as that of income per capita. The richest are hybrid households followed in descending order by entrepreneur households, cadre households and nonelite households. Table 5 Examining wealth components (also reported in Table 5 ), we find that an important reason for the small differences across the four categories in 1995 is that elite status does not provide an advantage regarding the value of land. We report that almost all rural households have access to land and that the value of land decreased by almost onethird from 1995 to 2002. There are several possible reasons for this development. One is that due to construction activities, the area available for farming has decreased across the years studied. Second, returns to farming activities have slightly decreased thereby decreasing the value of land. Third, there might be larger undervaluation in the 2002 survey than in the 1995 survey as questions were less precise. In contrast to the declining value of land, rural households in 2002 had accumulated other components of wealth. Financial assets were valued on average not less than 40 per cent higher than in 1995, and the increase in average housing wealth was as much as 54 per cent; the increase in average productive capital 65 per cent. A surprising exception from the growth trend is that in 2002 non-elite households did not own more expensive durables than in 1995 while the opposite was true for elites and particularly hybrid elite households.
How important is the gap between elites and non-elites for total inequality in rural China? To answer this question we compute a 'polarization' index following Zhang and Kanbur (2001) . This index is based on computing the index Mean Logarithmic Deviation (MLD) for household per capita income and household per capita total wealth for 1995 and 2002 for each category of household and for all of rural China. The MLD is an additively decomposable inequality index, a property not shared by the more familiar Gini-coefficient. Being additively decomposable means that 'total inequality' in rural China is equal to the sum of 'inequality within each category' weighted by its population share and a term expressing 'between category inequality'. The latter indicates how much inequality would disappear if mean income of each category were the same, but 'within category inequality' remained unchanged. Polarization is defined as the ratio of 'between category inequality' to 'total inequality' and can by definition take values from zero to one. If the index takes the value of 1 it means that all inequality is due to differences in mean inequality across categories while if it takes the value of zero it means that all inequality is within categories. Table A3 shows that polarization conditional on elite/non-elite category is rather small for both years under study and applies to income as well as wealth. This is expected from the results presented above; although we have earlier seen that means differ across categories and there is also considerable inequality within each category as illustrated in Figure 1 and Figure 2 . Table A3 also shows that, with the exception of income inequality in the western region, the 'between' category component increased from 1995 to 2002. The increase is particularly visible in the eastern region of rural China as polarization in income across categories of households went from 2 to 8 per cent, and the corresponding increase for wealth went from 1 to 5 per cent. 21 While not trivial, these proportions are much smaller than what have been reported from the same data when disaggregating income inequality in rural China by province. 22 21 Table A3 also shows that while income inequality in rural China as a whole decreased across the two years, the opposite took place for inequality in household wealth which is consistent with what has earlier been reported from the same data (see Gustafsson et al. 2008 and Zhao and Ding 2008) . 22 Gustafsson et al. (2008) report that 39 per cent of income inequality in 1995 as well as in 2002 can be attributed to differences in mean income across provinces. As there are spatial differences in mean income within provinces, the proportion of all income inequality in rural China that is spatial should be even larger.
Payoff from having elite status -estimating income functions
The existing literature on elite incomes in rural China, uses a variety of approaches to analyse the payoff from having elite status. While Nee (1989 Nee ( , 1991 Nee ( and 1996 includes income received during a previous year as explanatory variable in the models estimated, this is not the case in the models estimated by Walder (2002a) . This difference motivates us to specify and estimate regression models that capture both approaches. Following the method introduced by Nee (1996) we also disaggregate our samples in the spatial dimension. We choose to disaggregate the sample by mean household income in the county after having classified counties into quintiles. Table A4 in the Appendix shows an expected clear, though not perfect, relationship between county income quintile and region. Counties located in the western provinces of China are concentrated to the lower part of the distribution of county mean household income. With almost no exception, all counties in the richest quintile are located in the eastern regions. 23 However, we also report some eastern counties having average per capita income so low that they belong to the bottom quintile. 24 If the cross section pattern found by Walder (2002a) were applicable to the period studied here, one would expect that the payoff from cadre status would remain unchanged across years, while the payoff from entrepreneur status would decrease throughout rural China. However, the income source analysis presented in the previous section makes us doubt the latter.
When specifying the Walder (2002a) type of model, we use the following right hand side variables: years of education of household head, age of household head, age of household head squared, per cent of farm work in family, household per capita planting area, the number of household members and a dummy for minority status. In order to capture spatial differences there is a variable for average household income per capita in the county and a string of province dummies. One central concern of this study regards the coefficients for the dummies indicating elite category. We estimate one model using OLS for each year with household per capita income alternatively household per capita wealth as dependent variable.
We first estimate the models including one dummy variable for cadre status and one single variable for entrepreneur status and summarize these coefficients as well as the coefficients for education in Table 6 . The effects of education have increased from 1995 to 2002. In the income function it is an increase of two-thirds, and in the wealth function the relation in 2002 is four times as steep as in 1995. We have thus found support for one of the three predictions of the Market Transition Theory (as interpreted in the introduction). This was expected as there are now several indications that rates of return to education on income have increased in China as well as in other countries of transition during recent years. 25 We also find that the payoffs of cadre status and entrepreneur status are similar and positive in the income functions as well as in the 23 These counties are located in Beijing, Hebei, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shandong and Guangdong.
24 These counties are located in Hebei, Liaoning, Shandong and (in 1995) Zhejiang.
25 For a discussion on increased rates of return to education in China see also Heckman (2003) . Recent evidence on increased rates of return to education can be found in Zhang et al. (2005) (urban China) and Sicular et al. (2007) (for all of China). Fleisher et al. (2005) surveys the literature for a wide range of countries in transition.
wealth functions. The payoff of hybrid status is not surprisingly even larger. We also find that the payoffs for each of the three elites are larger in 2002 than in 1995. Table 6   Table 7 summarizes the results obtained when interacting cadre and entrepreneur status respectively with quintile of county per capita income. As our sample has relatively few hybrid elite households, we do not investigate possible differences in payoffs across counties with different household mean incomes. With few exceptions the coefficients for elite status are positive and estimated with high t-values. The main finding is that while the payoff of being a cadre household is not higher in the top income quintile of counties than in lower quintiles in 1995, the opposite is the case in 2002. This is true in the income function analysis and even more so in the wealth function analysis; the increase in the top quintile is propelling the increase in the elite payoffs compared over all counties as reported in Table 6 . Table 7 We finally turn to the estimates of the Nee type of model that include income observed two years earlier as explanatory variables (see Table 8 Table 8 In this section we found results that support some of the predictions from the Market Transition Theory. The returns to human capital in terms of income and wealth have increased over time and entrepreneurship has increased income and wealth during the period. However, the prediction that returns to political capital in terms of income and wealth are decreasing has not been confirmed. We have found that during the period 1995 to 2002 the payoffs of cadre status remained relatively constant in large parts of rural China, and that in the most prosperous counties they actually increased. Analyses of household per capita incomes and household per capita wealth provide similar pictures. In the concluding section we discuss possible reasons for this. We have also found that by and large estimates of two different types of models used in previous research on return to elite status in rural China provide similar pictures in our data.
Concluding discussion
Most countries that previously experienced planned socialist economies have now moved towards a market economy, thereby prompting a large body of literature on how elites are faring during the transition. The Chinese transition has differed from the transitions of East Europe and the former Soviet Union by starting earlier, by being gradual, by taking place during many years of economic growth, and by adding many non-market elements in policy and practice. Empirical findings from rural China therefore do not necessarily apply to other countries in transition.
In the statistical analysis we followed the existing literature by designating households as elites (cadre households, entrepreneur households and hybrid elite households) and non-elite households. We specified a multinominal logit model to compare determinants of a household's cadre, entrepreneur and hybrid elite status. While earlier studies concentrated on household income, we also studied household wealth. Our study has also investigated the importance of differences in mean income between elites and nonelites on the extent of inequality in rural China by computing numerical values of income inequality indices. Furthermore, when investigating the payoff from being an elite we used different specifications and investigated if elite payoffs vary by average household income in the county.
One significant finding in this study is that the determinants of a household's cadre status and entrepreneur status differ from each other in important respects. It is true that previous experience of working in enterprise signifies an increased probability for achieving all types of elite status. However, a long education is much more a route to cadre status than to entrepreneur status. This could indicate that skills learned by formal education, although of value for being an entrepreneur, are even more valuable for being a cadre (and a hybrid household). Alternatively, people who have a longer formal education have better access to networks useful for becoming an elite household. The probability of being an entrepreneur household is strongly linked to the age of the household head and also to the income level of the county. China's entrepreneur households are headed by comparably younger persons and live in better-off counties than non-elite households. This illustrates the common knowledge that economic opportunities in rural China have increased over time, but unevenly across space.
We have found during the period studied here that elites, particularly hybrid elite households, on average had higher per capita income than other households. Yet, we have also shown that income inequality in rural China as a whole would decrease only marginally if elite households were to have the same average income as non-elite households. For 1995 a surprisingly small proportion of inequality in household wealth would vanish if mean wealth for elites were to be the same as for the non-elites. The background to this situation is the rather even distribution of land in rural China. However, in 2002 the value of land had decreased, households had been able to save part of their rapidly increasing income and as a consequence the wealth gap between elites and non-elites was larger. The elite/non-elite dimension is of lesser importance for income inequality or wealth inequality in rural China than the spatial dimension. A much larger part of income inequality would disappear if average income differences in rural parts of China's provinces were to vanish than if the elite/non-elite differences in average income were to be totally eroded. In this sense, the main explanation for income inequality and wealth inequality in rural China stems from China's unequal spatial development.
While some of our findings support the Market Transition Theory, our results on the payoff from being a cadre are more in line with the Power Conversion Thesis and do not agree with predictions from the Market Transition Theory as they were not found to decrease during the period studied. In 2002 in the richest counties all located in the Eastern region of China, the payoff from being a cadre was higher than in other counties and higher than in high-income counties observed in 1995; another main finding from our study. When discussing this it should be remembered that cadres all over China receive income from various sources. Our study has shown that cadres who lived in rich counties in 2002 received much higher remuneration from their villages than cadres living in other parts of China observed in 1995. The question is why?
There are several possible answers. From a labour market perspective, markets have developed slowly in rural China. Cadres in the richest counties probably perform more demanding tasks than their counterparts in other counties. The local economy has become more complex and so has the local government. Furthermore, alternative income-generating possibilities should be most developed in the best-off counties. According to this manner of reasoning, the high cadre payoff in richer counties in the east is due to the need of local government to increase cadre wages to recruit persons willing to take on tasks often more demanding than in other parts of China. However, one might also approach the question of why the payoff from being a cadre is high in high-income counties in 2002 from a political/administrative perspective. Cadres in the best-off counties have decision power over a larger number of economic activities than in other counties. They are therefore in a better position to profit from political/administrative decisions. Such an explanation implies that forces from above (higher levels of the state) or from below (villagers) have not been successful in counteracting such tendencies. It should be an important task for future research to find empirical support for the possible explanations reported here for the high cadre payoffs in better-off counties of rural China. Is the income advantage of cadre status in high income counties mainly due to those cadres being more professional and skilful or is it because they are more corrupt? Note: Category A has the following characteristics: low parental education, parents not party members, and no experience of business. The head has no experience of being a soldier, working in enterprise, or management. The education of head is 0 years and the age of head is 50. The household is a northwest minority household, located in a village that received electricity during the period 1970-1979 and village income is in the first decile.
Source: Estimates presented in Table 2 . 1995 7,924 7,924 2002 8,197 8,197 Note: Coefficients obtained when regressing log per capita income alternatively log household wealth per capita include the following variables on the right: education of household head, age of household head, (age of household head), 2 per cent of adult family members doing out of farm work, per capita planning area of household, number of household members, one dummy for minority ethnic status, dummies for cadre status, entrepreneur status and hybrid elite status, per capita income in county and 18 dummies for province.
Source: Authors estimates from CHIP 1995 and 2002. 
